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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mitchell Nilan appeals

dismissing

the district

intermediate appeal from the judgment entered upon his conditional guilty pleas
to illegal consumption of alcohol by a minor and possession of an open
container.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The state charged Nilan with illegal consumption of alcohol by a minor
and possession of an open container. (R., pp.6, 19-20.)

The public defender's

office was appointed to represent Nilan on April 5, 2013, and Nilan entered not
guilty pleas on that same date.

(R., pp.2, 9.)

On May 10, 2013, Nilan's

appointed attorney filed a generic "Motion To Suppress Evidence," seeking
suppression

of "any and

all

evidence,

admissions,

confessions

and/or

statements made by and/or attributed to the defendant, which were illegally
obtained as the result of an unlawful detention of the defendant." (R., pp.23-24.)
The state opposed the motion "on the ground that it [was] untimely." (R., p.26.)
Specifically, the state argued:
The Defendant entered a not guilty plea on April 5, 2013. Pursuant
to Idaho Criminal Rule 12(d), the Defendant had twenty-eight days
from that date to file any Rule 12(b) motions. The Defendant's
Motion to Suppress was not filed until May 10, 2013, which is past
the permissible time limit to file such a motion and the Defendant
has thus far failed to establish good cause/excusable neglect for
the untimely filing.
(R., p.26.) Nilan's appointed attorney did not file a written response to the state's

objection, but on June 17, 2013, she filed a "Supplemental Memorandum In

1

Support Of Motion To Suppress," arguing the merits of the suppression motion.
(R., pp.29-35.)
At a hearing on July 1, 2013, the magistrate heard argument regarding the
timeliness of Nilan's suppression motion. (See generally 7/1 /13 Tr. 1; R., pp.3637.)

Appointed counsel acknowledged the motion was not timely filed but

argued good cause existed to excuse the untimely filing because the
suppression issue was "meritorious" and the state could not "show any
prejudice." (7/1/13 Tr., p.12, Ls.1-5, p.15, Ls.2-8.) Counsel also argued that,
despite having received discovery from the state on April 16, 2013, and despite
having actually filed a suppression motion on May 10, 2013, counsel was unable
to ascertain all the facts to support the suppression motion until she spoke with
her client at the pretrial conference on May 13, 2013. (7/1/13 Tr., p.16, L.1 p.17, L.15.) Finding Nilan's appointed attorney failed to demonstrate good cause
or excusable neglect to justify the late filing, the magi~trate sustained the state's
objection and declined to hear Nilan's untimely motion to suppress. (R., pp.3637.)
Nilan thereafter entered conditional guilty pleas to both the illegal
consumption and open container charges, reserving the right on appeal to
challenge the magistrate's adverse ruling regarding his motion to suppress. (R.,
pp.42-43.) The magistrate accepted Nilan's pleas and entered a judgment, from
which Nilan timely appealed. (R., pp.40, 45-47.)

1

The transcript of the July 1, 2013 hearing has been included as an Exhibit to
the record on appeal. (R., p.71.)
2

August 13, 2013, the district court entered an "Order Governing
Appeal," ordering
or before December 2nd , 2013."

to file and serve his Appellant's brief "on
, pp.50-51.) On December 2,

13, Nilan

filed a "Stipulation For New Briefing Schedule." (R., pp.54-55.) The stipulation,
which was signed by both Nilan's appointed attorney and the deputy city
prosecutor, requested that the briefing schedule be "vacate[d] ... at the Court's
convenience." (R., p.54.) The district court denied the request on December 6,
2013 (R., p.54) and, on that same date, entered an order dismissing Nilan's
appeal (R.,

pp.57-58).

Nilan's appointed

attorney filed

a motion for

reconsideration and an affidavit in support thereof, asking the court to reconsider
its order dismissing the appeal and setting forth the "reasons for and grounds as
to why an extension" of time for filing the Appellant's brief was necessary. (R.,
pp.59-61, 63-64.)

The district court denied the motion for reconsideration,

stating in a handwritten notation on the face of the motion that Nilan had made
"no showing of good cause."

(R., p.59 (capitalization altered).)

Nilan filed a

notice of appeal, timely from the district court's orders dismissing his
intermediate appeal and denying his motion for reconsideration. (R., pp.65-70.)
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ISSUES
Nilan states the issues on appeal as:
I.

Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr.
Nilan's Stipulation for New Briefing Schedule on December
6, 2013 and when it denied his Motion for Reconsideration
on December 20, 2013?

II.

Did the District Court violate Mr. Nilan's right to Due Process
of Law as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I,
section 13, of the Idaho Constitution, when it dismissed his
appeal on December 6, 2013?

(Appellant's brief, p.3.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Nilan failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by
denying his request for an extension of the briefing schedule, dismissing his
appeal for failing to timely file his Appellant's brief, and denying his motion for
reconsideration?
2.
Has Nilan failed to establish a due process violation resulting from the
dismissal of his intermediate appeal?
3.
If the district court erred, should its order of dismissal nevertheless be
affirmed on the alternative basis that Nilan is not entitled to relief on the merits of
the only issue he preserved for appeal?

4

ARGUMENT
I.

Nilan Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By
Denying His Request For An Extension Of The Briefing Schedule, Dismissing His
Appeal, And Denying His Motion For Reconsideration
Introduction
Nilan argues the district court abused its discretion by denying his request
for an extension of time to file his Appellant's brief, dismissing his appeal for
failing to failing to timely file his Appellant's brief, and denying his motion for
reconsideration. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-7.) A review of the record and of the
applicable law shows Nilan has failed to establish and abuse of discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
The decision whether to grant or deny a motion for extension of time for

filing an appellate brief is a matter within the appellate court's discretion. See

I.AR. 34(e), 46; I.C.R. 54.15, 54.18.

Likewise, "[t]he sanctions for failing to

diligently prosecute an appeal from the magistrate division are discretionary with
the district court; an exercise of sound judicial discretion will not be disturbed on
appeal." State v. Langdon, 117 Idaho 115,117,785 P.2d 679,681 (Ct. App.
1990) (citations omitted).
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C.

Nilan Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion By
Denying His Request For An Extension Of Time, Dismissing His Appeal,
And Denying His Motion For Reconsideration
1.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Denying Nilan's
Unsupported And/Or Inadequately Supported Requests For An
Extension Of The Briefing Schedule

Idaho Criminal Rule 54.15 provides that, in an appeal from the magistrate
division to the district court, appellate briefs "shall be ... filed and served within
the times provided for appeals to the Supreme Court by the Idaho Appellate
Rules, unless otherwise ordered by the district court." The criminal rules do not
specifically provide for extensions of time for the filing of appellate briefs to the
district court.

However, Idaho Appellate Rule 34(e), applicable to the criminal

rules by virtue of I.C.R. 54.18, states:
A motion for extension of time for filing a brief may be made
no later than the due date for the appellate brief and shall be
supported by an affidavit setting forth:
(1) The date when the brief is due;
(2) The number of extensions of time previously granted, and if
extensions were granted the original date when the brief was due;
(3) Whether any previous requests for extensions of time have
been denied or denied in part;
(4) The reasons or grounds why an extension is necessary;
(5) The number of days of extension deemed necessary and
the date on which the brief would become due;
(6) Whether there has been any stipulation of the parties for
this application for extension, which stipulation shall not be binding
upon the Court;
(7) The position of the opposing parties concerning the
application, and whether or not the opposing parties have verbally
expressed the agreement or disagreement;
(8) What assurance there is that the brief will be filed within the
extended time requested.
I.AR. 34(e).

The decision whether to grant an extension of time for filing an

appellate brief is discretionary. I.AR. 34(e), 46. The appellate rules make clear,
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that such extensions "shall not be favored" and may be granted "only
upon a

showing

extension

time to

good cause." I.AR. 34(e);

also I.AR. 46 (motion for
enlarged . . . for good cause

appellate brief

shown upon the motion of a party").
In this case, the district court entered an order requiring Nilan to file his
appellant's brief "on or before December 2

nd

,

2013." (R., p.50.) Nilan did not file

his appellant's brief by the prescribed deadline. Instead, on the day his brief was
due, Nilan filed a "Stipulation For New Briefing Schedule" in which Nilan's
attorney and the deputy city prosecutor indicated only that they "stipulate[d] and
agree[d] to vacate the current briefing schedule at the Court's convenience." (R.,
pp.54-55.)

The district court denied the stipulation and Nilan's subsequent

motion for reconsideration, ultimately finding Nilan failed to carry his burden of
showing "good cause" for the requested extension. (R., pp.54, 59.) Contrary to
Nilan's assertions, a review of the record supports the district court's decisions to
deny Nilan's motions because Nilan failed to make the requisite showing of
"good cause" justifying his request for an extension of the briefing schedule.
When Nilan requested an extension of the briefing schedule, he had
already been given more than three months in which to file his appellant's brief.
(Compare R., p.50 (Order Governing Procedure On Appeal, filed August 13,
2013) with R., p.54 (Stipulation For New Briefing Schedule, filed December 2,
2013).) Although the deputy city prosecutor stipulated to the request, the written
stipulation failed to set forth any information from which the district court could
make an informed decision regarding whether there was good cause to justify an
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extension. (R., p.54.) The stipulation did not set forth the date on which the brief
was originally due, the reasons or grounds why an extension was necessary, the
number of days of extension deemed necessary, or what assurance there was
that the brief would be filed within the extended time requested. (R., p.54.) Nor
was the stipulation accompanied by an affidavit setting forth any of the foregoing
information as required by I.A.R. 34(e). Because Nilan failed to comply with the
specific requirements of I.AR. 34(e) and did not otherwise even attempt to make
a showing of good cause to justify an extension of time, the district court acted
well within its discretion in denying Nilan's original request for an extension of the
briefing schedule.
The court also acted within its discretion in denying Nilan's motion for
reconsideration.

In an apparent attempt to remedy her failure to provide an

affidavit supporting the original request for an extension of the briefing schedule,
Nilan's attorney supported the motion for reconsideration with an affidavit setting
forth several "reasons for and grounds as to why an extension [was] necessary."
(R., pp.63-64.)

Specifically, counsel cited an "[u]nexpected family illness,"

"[p]reviously scheduled time out of state," a large caseload, work on other
appellate cases, and inadequate time to research and prepare the brief in Nilan's
case as the bases of her request for an extension. (R., pp.63-64.) Nilan argues
on appeal that these reasons necessarily amounted to a showing of "good
cause" justifying his request for an extension of the briefing schedule.
(Appellant's brief, p.6 n.1.)

The district court obviously disagreed, however.

(See R., p.59 (motion for reconsideration denied because "no showing of good
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cause" (capitalization altered)).)

Contrary to Nilan's assertions, the record

the district court's decision.
Most of the reasons
the brief by the December

attorney cited

being unable to complete

2013 deadline related to events that occurred in the

latter part of October and all of November 2013. (R., pp.63-64.) The briefing
schedule had been set in mid-August 2013, however, thereby giving Nilan's
attorney more than three months in which to complete the brief by the prescribed
deadline. Nilan's attorney did not even attempt in her affidavit to explain why she
had not begun working on Nilan's appellant's brief before October or November.
Nor did she include in the affidavit any information regarding the number of
additional days she deemed necessary to file the brief or any assurance that the
brief would be filed with the requested extension of time. Given the lack of these
details, all of which were required by I.A.R. 34(e), the district court could
reasonably conclude that the circumstances that prevented Nilan's attorney from
working on and/or completing the brief in the several weeks leading up to the
December 2nd deadline - many of which were presumably known to Nilan's
attorney when the briefing schedule was set - did not constitute "good cause"
/ justifying an extension of the briefing deadline for some further unknown period
of time beyond the three months Nilan's attorney had already been given.
Nilan recognizes the district court had discretion to deny his request for an
extension of the briefing schedule. (Appellant's brief, p.5.) He argues, however,
that because the court had "recently accepted a stipulation for a new briefing
schedule" in an entirely separate case in which "[t]he parties followed a similar
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procedure," the court should likewise have accepted the stipulation in this case.
(Appellant's brief, p.5.) Nilan's argument is without merit. Whatever the court
did or did not do in relation to a stipulation for an extension of a briefing schedule
in a different case is irrelevant to whether the court acted within its discretion in
this case in denying Nilan's request for an extension.

Because Nilan never

supported the request for an extension (either originally or in relation to his
motion for reconsideration) with an affidavit meeting the requirements of I.A.R.
34(e), the district court acted well within its discretion in denying the request for
an extension. This is true even though the parties stipulated to the request. See
I.A.R. 34(e)(6) (a "stipulation of the parties for [an] application for extension ...
shall not be binding upon the Court"). Nilan has failed to establish an abuse of
discretion.

2.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Dismissing
Nilan's Appeal As A Sanction For Nilan's Failure To Timely File His
Appellant's Brief

"Dismissal of an appeal is a permissible sanction when the appellant fails
to file a timely brief." Hoopes v. Bagley, 117 Idaho 1091, 793 P.2d 1263 (Ct.
App. 1990) (citing I.A.R. 21; I.R.C.P. 83(s)); accord I.C.R. 54.13; Woods v.
Crouse, 101 Idaho 764, 620 P.2d 798 (1980); State v. Langdon, 117 Idaho 115,
117, 785 P.2d 679, 681 (Ct. App. 1990) (Per Curiam). The decision whether to
sua sponte dismiss an appeal for the failure to file a timely appellant's brief lies

within the appellate court's discretion. Langdon, 117 Idaho at 117, 785 P.2d at
681.

But see McNett v. McNett, 95 Idaho 59, 501 P.2d 1059 (1972) (party
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dismissal of appeal

In Langdon,

opposing party's failure to timely file appellant's

sua sponte

the

Langdon's

intermediate appeal after Langdon failed to timely file his appellant's brief. 117
Idaho at 116, 785 P.2d at 680.

Langdon appealed the order of dismissal,

arguing he never received notice of the date on which his brief was due.
Langdon, 117 Idaho at 117, 785 P.2d at 681. Because the record reflected the
notice was accompanied by an affidavit of service certifying that copies of the
notice were sent to both the prosecutor's office and Langdon's attorney, the
Idaho Court of Appeals concluded "the district judge [could not] be faulted for
assuming that Langdon's attorney had chosen to ignore the established deadline
for filing a brief."

&

The Court also rejected, as being unsupported by the

record, Langdon's assertion that the county clerk failed to actually mail Langdon
the notice informing him of the briefing deadline.

&

"Although the district judge

could have imposed a less onerous sanction under the circumstances," the Court
of Appeals "[found] no reason to reverse his ruling based upon the record before
him" and, therefore, did "not disturb the order dismissing Langdon's appeal."

kl

In this case, as in Langdon, the district court sua sponte dismissed Nilan's
appeal after Nilan failed to timely file his appellant's brief. (R., pp.57-58.) Nilan
argues this was an abuse of discretion, claiming that, in contrast to the facts of
Langdon, "[t]he circumstances in this case are that the appellant did not just
ignore a deadline, or not seek to file any briefing with the court," but instead
"followed the proscribed [sic] appellate rules of procedure by asking for a
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continuance of time in which

to file the briefing." (Appellant's brief, p.6.) The

state acknowledges Nilan sought an of extension of time in which to file his
appellant's brief; but, in doing so, he in no way followed the applicable rules of
appellate procedure. As set forth in more detail in the preceding section, Nilan's
original request for an extension was not accompanied by any affidavit at all,
much less one satisfying the requirements of I.A.R. 34(e). Without having been
provided any information from which to determine whether there was good cause
to grant an extension, the district court was in no better position than the court in
Langdon and was left to assume that Nilan had merely chosen to ignore or, at
best, arbitrarily change the established briefing deadline without any basis for
doing so. Considering the record before it at the time, the district court did not
abuse its discretion by sua sponte dismissing Nilan's appeal as a sanction for
failing to timely file his brief.
Citing Langdon, Nilan also appears to argue that the district court abused
its discretion by sua sponte dismissing his appeal without giving him "prior notice
and [an] opportunity to be heard."

(Appellant's brief, p.6.)

This argument is

without merit. As already discussed, the Langdon Court upheld a sua sponte
order of dismissal as being within the district court's discretion, and it did so
despite the fact that the district court did not give Langdon prior notice of its
intent to dismiss his appeal. Langdon, 117 Idaho at 117, 785 P.2d at 681. The
Court then addressed, as a separate issue, whether the district court erred by
refusing to allow Landon to file a timely petition for rehearing.
P.2d at 681-82.

1st at 117-18, 785

Addressing that question, the Langdon Court held that the

12

notice and opportunity to be heard or to file

an appeal, "without

dismissal,

concerning

a

circumstance" requiring that

represents

an

extraordinary

appellant be given "an opportunity

seek

court's reconsideration." l.9.:_at 118,785 P.2d at 682.
Unlike Langdon, who was prohibited from seeking reconsideration, Nilan
filed a motion for reconsideration asking for relief from the court's order of
dismissal.

(R., pp.59-61, 63-64.)

By entertaining that motion, the court gave

Nilan the opportunity to be heard regarding the reasons the appeal should not be
dismissed, which is all that Langdon requires. That the court ultimately denied
the motion on its merits does not establish an abuse of discretion. Nilan never
complied with the requirements of I.AR 34(e) - either in relation to his original
request for an extension of the briefing schedule or in conjunction with his motion
for reconsideration. Having failed to make the requisite showing of good cause
for extending the briefing schedule, Nilan cannot show that the court abused its
discretion by declining to reconsider its order dismissing Nilan's appeal for failing
to file a timely appellant's brief.

11.
Nilan Has Failed To Establish A Due Process Violation Resulting From The
Dismissal Of His Intermediate Appeal

A

Introduction
Nilan argues the district court violated his right to procedural due process

by dismissing his intermediate appeal without giving him prior notice and a
reasonable period of time within which to file his appellant's brief. (Appellant's
brief, pp.7-9.)

Nilan's argument fails.
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By entertaining Nilan's motion for

reconsideration, the district court ultimately afforded Nilan all the process he was
in relation to the dismissal of his appeal.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Due process issues are generally questions of law, and this Court

exercises free review over questions of law." Kootenai Medical Center ex rel.
Teresa K. v. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare, 147 Idaho 872, 216 P.3d 630
(2009) (citations and quotations omitted).

C.

Nilan's Claim Of A Due Process Violation Fails Because He Was
Ultimately Given Notice Of And An Opportunity To Be Heard Regarding
The Dismissal Of His Appeal
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
Procedural due process requires that, except in extraordinary circumstances, "a
person, whose protected rights are being adjudicated," must receive notice and
an opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."
State v. Smith, 146 Idaho 822, 828, 203 P.3d 1221, 1227 (2009) (citations
omitted). "Protected liberty interests can arise from two sources, either the Due
Process Clause or the laws of the states." Lightner v. Hardison, 149 Idaho 712,
717, 239 P.3d 817, 822 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing Kentucky Dep't of Corrs. V.
Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)).

"When the language of state statutes

and regulations create a right, that right is entitled to due process protection." !Q,_
(citing Mendoza v. Blodgett, 960 F.2d 1425, 1432-33 (9 th Cir. 1992)).
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that because his right to appeal his conditional

plea

statute, he "is invested with a protected liberty interest in
statutory right to appeal" and "cannot constitutionally be deprived of this interest
without procedures which provide him due process." (Appellant's brief, p.8.) He
further contends that, by sua sponte dismissing his intermediate appeal without
giving him prior notice or a reasonable period of time within which to file his
appellant's brief, the district court violated his rights to procedural due process.
(Appellant's brief, pp.7-9.)

Nilan's argument fails.

Even assuming he was

entitled to the protections of procedural due process in relation to the dismissal
of his appeal, the record shows the court ultimately afforded Nilan all the process
he was due.
After the district court dismissed Nilan's appeal for failing to file a timely
appellant's brief, Nilan filed a motion for reconsideration, and an affidavit in
support thereof, setting forth the arguments and facts that he believed
countenanced against the dismissal of his appeal. (R., pp.59-61.) The district
court entertained the motion but ultimately denied it, concluding Nilan had made
"no showing of good cause" justifying either an extension of time or
reconsideration of the order of dismissal.

(R., p.59.)

By entertaining Nilan's

request for an extension and then his motion to reconsider, the district court
ultimately gave Nilan notice of and an opportunity to be heard regarding the

2

Nilan was also put on notice by I.C.R. 54.13 and I.AR. 21 that his appeal could
be dismissed if he failed to timely file his appellant's brief.
15

contemplated reasons for dismissal before finally disposing of Nilan's appeal.
Compare Langdon, 117 Idaho at 117-18, 785 P.2d at 681-82 (permitting
appellant to seek reconsideration of court's sua sponte order

dismissal

effective to remedy court's failure to give prior notice and opportunity to be heard
concerning reasons for dismissal).

Having been afforded such notice and an

opportunity to be heard, Nilan has failed to establish any violation of his due
process rights.
Nilan argues that the district court was required, as a matter of procedural
due process, to not only afford him notice and an opportunity to be heard
regarding the proposed bases for dismissal, but also to afford him a reasonable
time within which to file his appellant's brief before dismissing his appeal.
(Appellant's brief, p.9.)

This argument is frivolous.

As previously stated,

procedural due process requires only that a person receive notice and an
opportunity to be heard before being deprived of a protected right. Smith, 146
Idaho at 828, 203 P.3d at 1227. While Nilan had a statutory right to appeal, he
did not have the right to file an untimely appellant's brief. Indeed, the appellate
rules specifically provide for dismissal as a permissible sanction for failing to
timely take any step in the appellate process. I.AR. 21; I.C.R. 54.13. Because
Nilan failed to comply with the appellate rules, the district court had discretion to
dismiss Nilan's appeal without first affording Nilan the opportunity to file a
belated brief.

That the court did so, after giving Nilan the opportunity to respond

in his motion for reconsideration to the basis for dismissal, does not constitute a
violation of Nilan's due process rights.
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district court ultimately afforded Nilan all the process he was
the

in

his intermediate appeal, Nilan has

to

for reversal.

111.
If The Court Erred, Its Order Of Dismissal Should Nevertheless Be
Affirmed On The Alternative Basis That Nilan Is Not Entitled To Relief
On The Merits Of The Only Issue He Preserved For Appeal
A.

Introduction
When Nilan entered his conditional guilty pleas to the charges in this

case, the only issue he preserved for appeal was whether the magistrate abused
its discretion by declining to entertain his untimely motion to suppress.
pp.42-43.)

(R.,

By dismissing Nilan's appeal, the district court effectively denied

Nilan relief as to this issue. For the reasons set forth in Sections II and 111, supra,
the district court neither abused its discretion nor violated Nilan's due process
rights by dismissing his intermediate appeal. If this Court disagrees, the district
court's order of dismissal should nevertheless be affirmed on the alternative
basis that Nilan is not entitled to relief on the merits of the appeal - i.e., Nilan
cannot show from the record that the magistrate abused its discretion in
declining to hear his untimely motion to suppress. See Hoopes v. Bagley, 117
Idaho 1091, 1092, 793 P.2d 1263, 1264 (Ct. App. 1990) (because effect of order
dismissing intermediate appeal "was simply to deny relief on appeal," Court of
Appeals could uphold the order of dismissal upon a determination that the
appellant "was not entitled to relief, in any event, on the merits of the appeal").
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Standard Of Review
A trial court's decision whether to enlarge the time for filing a motion to
suppress is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Glenn, 156 Idaho 22,
_ , 319 P.3d 1191, 1192-93 (2014). The appellate court will "uphold the trial

court's decision when the court (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently
with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3)
reached its decision by an exercise of reason."

kl

at _ , 319 P.3d at 93

(internal quotations and citation omitted).

C.

The Magistrate Correctly Exercised Its Discretion In Denying Nilan's
Motion To Suppress On The Basis That It Was Not Timely Filed
Motions to suppress evidence "must be filed within twenty-eight (28) days

after the entry of a plea of not guilty or seven (7) days before trial whichever is
earlier." I.C.R. 12(b), (d). Nilan pied not guilty on April 5, 2013, and his trial was
set for June 6, 2013. (R., pp.2, 9.) Pursuant to I.C.R. 12(d), Nilan's motion to
suppress was due no later than May 3, 2013, which was the earlier of the two
dates contemplated by I.C.R. 12(d). Nilan did not, however, file his motion until
May 10, 2013, seven days after the time for filing the motion expired. (R., pp.2324.)
Although I.C.R. 12(d) allows the district court to enlarge the time for filing
a Rule 12(b) motion, in exercising that discretion, the court must find that the
defendant has shown good cause or excusable neglect. I.C.R. 12(d). After a
hearing at which Nilan was given the opportunity to demonstrate good cause or
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an enlargement of time, the magistrate found Nilan
A review of the record

of

supports that determination.
The only reasons Nilan's attorneys offered as justifying the late filing were
that the suppression motion was "meritorious," that the state could not "show any
prejudice," and that, despite having received discovery from the state on April 16,
2013, counsel was unable to ascertain all the facts to support the suppression
motion until she spoke with her client at the pretrial conference on May 13, 2013.
(7/1/13 Tr., p.12, Ls.1-5, p.15, Ls.2-8, p.16, L.1 - p.17, L.15.) None of these
reasons

demonstrated

enlargement of time.

good

cause

or

excusable

neglect justifying

an

See State v. Dice, 126 Idaho 595, 597, 887 P.2d 1102,

1104 (Ct. App. 1994) ("Idaho Criminal Rule 12(d) clearly requires either good
cause or excusable neglect to be shown by a party who has missed the
prescribed deadlines.

Allowing untimely motions to be heard because they

appear meritorious eviscerates the purpose of the rule."); State v. Irving, 118
Idaho 673, 674, 799 P.2d 471, 472 (Ct. App. 1990) (no showing of good cause
or excusable neglect where, despite lack of prejudice to state, and despite
state's failure to timely provide discovery, defendant was in possession of
information upon which to base a suppression motion before filing deadline).
Because Nilan never offered an explanation for the delay that could have formed
the basis of a finding of good cause or excusable neglect, the magistrate did not
abuse its discretion by denying Nilan's motion to suppress on the basis that it
was untimely.
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Because Nilan is not entitled to relief from the magistrate's order denying
motion to suppress as untimely, the district court's order dismissing Nilan's
intermediate appeal should be affirmed on this basis.

Hoopes v. Bagley, 117

Idaho 1091, 1092, 793 P.2d 1263, 1264 (Ct. App. 1990); State v. Avelar, 129
Idaho 700, 704, 931 P.2d 1218, 1222 (1997) (where the lower court reaches the
correct result by a different theory, the appellate court will affirm the order on the
correct theory).

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
order dismissing Nilan's intermediate appeal.
th

DATED this 9 day of September 2014.

I A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney G
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